This study was designed to address the issue of whether there is a general processor for the perception of emotion or whether there are separate processors. We examined the relationships among three channels of emotional communication in 100 healthy right-handed adult males and females. The channels were facial, prosodic/intonational, and lexical/verbal; both identification and discrimination tasks of emotional perception were utilised. Statistical analyses controlled for nonemotional perceptual factors and subject characteristics (i.e. demographic and general cognitive). For identification, multiple significant correlations (...) were found among the channels. For discrimination, fewer correlations were significant. Overall, these results provide support for the notion of a general processor for emotional perceptual identification in normal adult subjects. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Simone de Beauvoir’s ethics. My aim is to discuss the intimate relation of freedom and rights in order to suggest that the ethical implications of her phenomenological-existentialist analysis of the human condition, developed mainly in The ethics of ambiguity, can make a valuable contribution to ethical value and corroboration of human rights, the conceptual grounding of which is sometimes received with intellectual skepticism. I argue that in Beauvoir’s ethical theory, grounded on the will to freedom, not (...) only do rights become more intelligible but their significance also becomes more communicable. By making freedom conditional upon willing not only that oneself be free but that everyone else may also be free, Beauvoir advances a universal demand for the most basic conditions necessary for individuals to realize themselves. Accordingly, Beauvoir’s conception of genuine freedom, incorporating the value of freedom and the duty to act in recognition of this value, gives us the possibility to argue for the requisite freedoms as well as the necessity to substantiate these freedoms in human rights. (shrink)

The split between analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy has mainly preoccupied scholars of philosophy so far, but in fact, it has broader pedagogical implications. This article argues that conventions of argumentative writing, as taught in colleges today, have their roots in analytic philosophy and its assumptions regarding ways of disseminating knowledge. Behind writing instructors’ emphasis on the ‘thesis and evidence’ structure lie analytic tendencies such as verifiability and intersubjectivity. By contrast, Continental philosophy emphasises the subjective human experience, which leads to (...) a more experimental form of writing. This split and the embeddedness of argumentation in analytic philosophy is indispensable in comprehending the rationale behind the conventions of academic writing taught in colleges today. (shrink)

Unintentional plagiarism abounds at universities. The literature offers several explanations for students’ difficulties with acquiring standards of good academic practice. In this paper, I propose an alternative account: unintentional plagiarism can only be understood in the context of implicit but irreconcilable forms of knowledge. While higher education institutions mainly operate within the framework of propositional epistemology, institutions of primary and secondary education tend to furnish students with encyclopedic epistemology. Accordingly, universities and institutions of pre-college education tend to propagate conflicting assumptions (...) regarding the nature of knowledge. Put simply, propositional epistemology is characterized by dialogue, agency and the exchange of ideas, which are ideally made explicit in academic writing. By contrast, encyclopedic epistemology tends to present knowledge monologically, leaving the scholarly conversation around it out. It is highly likely that the hardwired legacy of encyclopedic epistemology among students impedes the acquisition of the dialogism of academic inquiry at universities, resulting in cases of unintentional plagiarism. (shrink)

In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target (...) his thesis that a given subject sees all the objects that are visually differentiated in her visual field, where visual differentiation does not require that she notice those objects. I argue that the notion of a visual field deployed in the formulation of the thesis cannot be phenomenal and therefore that seeing without noticing amounts to mere visual confrontation. I further argue that since the epistemicist does not deny the existence of seeing without noticing in the sense of mere visual confrontation, there is a clear sense in which Dretske's non-epistemicism turns out to be trivial. (shrink)

İslâm’ın ilk dönemlerinden itibaren Kur’ân’da Arapça dışında bir kelimenin bulunup bulunma-dığı hususunda farklı görüşler ileri sürülmüştür. Bu görüşler çerçevesinde mesele, Kur’ân’da yabancı dillerden bazı kelimelerin bulunup bulunmadığı merkezinde tartışıldığı gibi, bazı kelimelerin köken itibarıyla Arapça olmakla beraber şer’î terminolojinin ortaya çıkışı sonra-sında Arapların o zamana kadar bilmediği yeni anlamlar kazanmış olmasının Kur’ân’ın arabî olmasına engel teşkil edip etmeyeceği boyutuyla da tartışılmıştır. Şâfiî, Kur’ân’ın arabîliği görüşünün ilk ve en tavizsiz savunucularından biridir. Kur’ân, muhatapları Arap olduğu için Arapça nazil olmuştur. Her dil, (...) o dili konuşan halkın kültürünü ve düşünce yapısını da barındı-rır. Şâfiî nazarında Kur’ân’ın arabî olması Arap dilinin kurallarına, üslubuna uygun olmasının ötesinde Arap kültürünü ve düşünce yapısını da barındırması demektir. Muhataplar açısından bakınca da kendi dillerinde inen vahyin kendileri için olabildiğince açık/mübin olması gerekir. Dolayısyla Şâfiî’nin er-Risâle’de, nasslardan hüküm çıkarırken Arapçanın kural ve üsluplarını dikkate alma üzerine kurmuş olduğu beyân teorisi Kur’an’ın arabî olması ile yakından alakalı-dır. Bu makalede Şâfiî’nin konuya dair görüşleri er-Risâle isimli eseri merkeze alınarak tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap dili, Fıkıh, Şâfiî, Beyân, Kur’an’ın Arabîliği. (shrink)

Throughout their life Ibn Sînâ and Descartes firmly believed that the soul or mind of a human being was essentially incorporeal. In his ‘On the Soul’ (De anima), the psychological part of his vast...

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...) concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”. (shrink)

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.

A new Turkish Penal Code came into effect on 1 June 2005. Article 280 concerns health care workers’ failure to report a crime. This article removes the responsibility from health care workers to maintain confidentiality, but also removes patients’ right to confidentiality. It provides for up to one year of imprisonment for a health care worker who, while on duty, finds an indication that a crime might have been committed by a patient and who does not inform the responsible authorities (...) about it. This forces the health care worker to divulge the patient’s confidential information. A patient who thinks he or she may be accused of a crime may therefore not seek medical help, which is the universal right of every person. The article is therefore contrary to medical ethics, oaths taken by physicians and nurses, and the understanding of patient confidentiality. (shrink)

Le mouvement des femmes en Turquie n’a jamais été homogène. Son évolution doit plutôt être envisagée comme l’histoire de solidarités et de divergences à différents moments, souvent en interaction avec les débats politiques du pays. Cet article a pour objectif de présenter la trajectoire du mouvement féministe en Turquie, à commencer par ses racines à l’époque ottomane jusqu’à aujourd’hui, en se focalisant sur les moments charnières qui ont jalonné son histoire. Il insiste notamment sur le mouvement antiféministe et anti-genre qui (...) se reflète dans le débat « égalité des genres ou justice de genre » opposant les féministes laïques aux islamistes. (shrink)

This article begins with an examination of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of emanation and its origin within the Greek and Islamic philosophical traditions. Secondly, I present his view of the multiplicity of the universe from a single unitary First Cause, followed by a discussion of the function of the Active Intellect in giving rise to the existence of the sublunary world and its contents. In the second part of the article, I consider Cartesian cosmology, without, however, going into detail about what (...) Descartes calls the ‘imaginary new world,’ the problems arising from the mechanical worldview. Note is made of the conflict between Descartes and the Scholastic and Orthodox Christian concept of cosmos. This article provides an account and comparison of Ibn Sīnā’s and Descartes’ portrayal of the origins and structure of the universe of both philosophers. (shrink)

This article begins with an examination of Ibn Sīnā’s conception of emanation and its origin within the Greek and Islamic philosophical traditions. Secondly, I present his view of the multiplicity of the universe from a single unitary First Cause, followed by a discussion of the function of the Active Intellect in giving rise to the existence of the sublunary world and its contents. In the second part of the article, I consider Cartesian cosmology, without, however, going into detail about what (...) Descartes calls the ‘imaginary new world,’ the problems arising from the mechanical worldview. Note is made of the conflict between Descartes and the Scholastic and Orthodox Christian concept of cosmos. This article provides an account and comparison of Ibn Sīnā’s and Descartes’ portrayal of the origins and structure of the universe of both philosophers. (shrink)

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...) fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn’s so-called mysterianism may not sound as far-fetched as it would otherwise sound.

In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.

In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found (...) in Klein’s works to this argument, and my aim is to show that none of those responses can be plausibly held without infinitism losing its title to being a genuine non-skeptical alternative. (shrink)